

knowledge,—in the same manner as Sense-perception is. If a certain thing is cognised by *one* means of cognition, it does not cease to be *cognised* if it is not cognised by another means of cognition [so that if the result of the act is cognised by means of the Vedic Word, it cannot be regarded as *not cognised* simply because that result is not cognised by other means of cognition]. Then again it is nowhere declared in the Veda that “the reward of the act is obtained merely by the performance of the act”; all that is said is that “the reward of the act is obtained”.—As for the argument that “at the time when the reward does appear, it is cognised by means of *Sense-perception* and not by means of the Word”,—this does not vitiate our position; because at that time Sense-perception is one means of cognising the reward, and Word also is the other means.

The opponent has cited a passage from the Veda which asserts something contrary to a fact of direct perception,—the passage which says that “the sacrificer equipped with the sacrificial implements proceeds straight to the heavenly regions”, where it is clearly the body that is spoken of (as proceeding to Heaven; while as a matter of fact the body is burnt).—Our answer to this is that in fact that entity also to whom the body belongs is spoken of as “equipped with the sacrificial implements”, by reason of the connection of those implements with the body (to which the said entity is related).—The opponent asks—“What is this other entity? We do not know of any such entity (apart from the body)”.—We infer the existence of such an entity through such acts as breathing and the like; so that the entity spoken of as “equipped with the sacrificial implements” is one who carried on such activities in the body as breathing in, breathing down, breathing out, winking, and so forth.—“But it is the body itself that breathes in and breathes down.”—Not so; breathing and the rest cannot belong to the same category as the properties of the body, because they do not continue to exist as long as the body lasts; as a matter of fact we find that the properties of the body, colour and the rest, continue to exist as long as the body is there; on the other hand, breathing and the rest cease to exist even while the body is there. Then again, Pleasure, Pain, and such other feelings are cognised only by the person himself, while colour and other properties belonging to the body are perceived by other persons also. [This also shows that there are certain activities of the person which belong to an entity other than the body.] From this fact of there being certain properties which differ from the properties belonging to the body, the conclusion is that the entity spoken of as ‘equipped with the sacrificial implements’ is other than the body.

The opponent asks—“How is it known that there is an entity other than Pleasure and other Cognitions to whom these latter belong? As a matter of fact, we do not see any form of such an entity apart from Pleasure and other Cognitions. This leads to the conclusion that the said entity is as non-existent as the Hare’s Horn.—If it be asked—‘To whom then do Pleasure and the rest belong?’—our answer would be that they belong to no one. It is not necessary that whatever is perceived must be related to some one else; we recognise one thing as ‘related’ to another only when we actually perceive the things related, as also the relation itself: When we see the moon or the

sun, we do not proceed to search the thing to which the moon or the sun belongs; in fact, we recognise that they belong to no one. From this we conclude that there is no entity apart from Pleasure and the rest to whom these latter belong.—Then again, if it be absolutely necessary to assume an entity to whom every perceived thing is related, then, in the same manner, on perceiving the *Self* (soul), we should search for another relative to whom that *Self* would belong;—and having found such another relative, we should search for yet another to whom this latter would belong; and so on and on there would be no end to such assumptions. If (in order to save yourself from this unending series of assumptions) you would not assume a further relative after having assumed a relative at a certain stage,—and you would stop short at that, and feel satisfied,—then you can rest content with positing the '*Vijñāna*' (Idea, Cognition) pure and simple and desist from all further assumptions."

Our answer to the above is as follows:—If there is no entity apart from the *Cognition*, then who is it that is spoken of as 'he knows'? The entity spoken of by this phrase is the nominative agent of the act of *cognising*; for the purpose of making this phrase give some sense, we should assume the existence of the *Self* distinct from the *Cognition*.

Says the opponent:—"Let the Divinities (Read '*devāḥ*') assume a meaning for the phrase if they regard it necessary to assume it! [It is beyond our power to do it]. As a matter of fact, there are many people upholding the existence of the *Self* who say 'the *Self* exists', who directly utter the word '*Self*'; and yet even these people do not succeed in assuming the existence of the *Self*; how much less possible is it to assume its existence on the basis of the indirect expression 'he cognises'? Hence we conclude that the assumption of the *Self* is not right."

Our answer is as follows:—It is through *Desire* that we perceive the *Self*.—"How so?"—*Desire* appears only when the desired object is one that has been perceived before: for instance, we have no desire for those sweet fruits that grow to the North of the Meru mountains and which have never before been tasted by people like us. Nor does *Desire* appear in one person for an object that has been perceived by another person. And yet *Desire* does appear in a person for an object perceived by him on the previous day. From this we conclude that the person *desiring* and the person *perceiving* must be the same. If mere *Cognition* had been the *perceived* then, inasmuch as that *Cognition* would have disappeared on the preceding day (when the object was perceived), how could there be a *Desire* (for the same object) on the following day? If, on the other hand, there is a *cogniser* apart from the *Cognition*, who is everlasting, then the person *perceiving* the object on one day would be the same as the one *desiring* it on the other day. The phenomenon of *Desire* would be impossible otherwise.

Says the opponent:—"In regard to what do we have the idea that *it cannot be possible*? It is only in regard to what cannot be known by any means of right knowledge. Now, as a matter of fact, we do not know anything other than *Cognition* (Idea); and what we do not know we conclude to be non-existent, like the Hare's Horns. Nor is it impossible to have *Cognition* without that unknown something; because we actually have a direct

perception of the Cognition. That the Cognition has a momentary existence,—that too is a fact directly perceived. And yet, even though we have no *Cogniser* apart from the *Cognition*,—and even though the Cognition is not a lasting entity (as it has only a momentary existence),—it is not impossible for Desire to appear on the next day; because we actually perceive the Desire so appearing. Nor have we found it always to be the case that the *Cogniser* today is the same as the *Desirer* on the next day; all that we have found is that in some cases what has been *perceived* by one man is *desired* by another, while in other cases it is not so. In fact [there being nothing except an influx of series of Cognitions] what happens is that within the same series one (Cognition) desires what has been perceived by another (Cognition); but in case the two belong to two different series, one does not desire what has been perceived by another. From all this we conclude that there is no Self apart from Cognitions like Pleasure and the rest.”

Our answer to the above is as follows:—It is not possible that persons who do not *remember* (i.e. have an idea of) a thing should *desire* it; nor is remembrance possible of what has not been perceived before; hence it is impossible that there should be remembrance in what is a mere momentary Cognition (Idea).

Says the opponent:—“The case of Remembrance is like that of Desire; what is called ‘remembrance’ is either a Cognition similar to a previous Cognition, or a Cognition having a previous Cognition as its object [and the same is the case with Desire also]. Now (such being the nature of Remembrance and Desire) even if the seer (i.e. the Cognition of the previous day) has ceased to exist on the next day, it cannot be impossible (for the Remembrance or the Desire) to appear on that day [i.e. there is nothing incongruous in the appearance of a Cognition on the second day which is similar to, or has for its object, the preceding day’s Cognition]; for the simple reason that we directly perceive that this does happen. What happens is that when a Cognition has been cognised by another Cognition, it is recalled by another Cognition occurring in the same series as the former apprehending Cognition,—and not by a Cognition appearing in the series of another Cognition.—From all this we conclude that Cognitions are entirely *Void* (i.e. without any extraneous substratum in the shape of the *Self*). In support of this view we have the following Brāhmaṇa text also:—‘This pure Cognition which rising out of the elemental substances (of the body, at death) enters those same substances, and there is no consciousness after death.’ (*Bṛhadāraṇyaka-Upaniṣad*, 4.5.13).”

Our answer to the above is that it cannot be as set forth above; as a matter of fact, it is only when one has seen a thing on one day that he has the notion (Remembrance) on the next day in the form ‘I have seen it’; and this notion (of Recognition) appears only in the Self, not in anything else; as in the case of anything else, the entity that would have seen the thing on the previous day could be some one totally different (from the one recognising it on the second day). Hence it follows that there is something apart from Cognitions, and it is to this something that the term ‘I’ is applied.

Says the opponent:—“In several cases the term ‘I’ is applied figuratively to entities other than the Self,—when, for instance, a man says ‘I

am the son', 'I am Devadatta', 'I am going' [where the term 'I' stands for the *body*—says the *Shlokavārtika*, *Ātmavāda* 108]."

Our answer to this is that we do not put forward the use of the term 'I' as a *reason* for our conclusion (that there is a Self apart from the Cognitions); what we are pointing out (as the reason) is something different from the word 'I'; what we are pointing out (as our reason) is the *recognitive notion* [The right reading is '*pratyabhijñāpratyayam*' as found in *Nyāyaratnākara*, p. 716] that we have to the effect that 'It was *we* that saw this thing on one day, and it is *we* that remember it today'; which shows that we recognise the fact that 'it is *we* that existed yesterday and it is the same *we* that exist today'; and the entities that existed yesterday and exist today also could not have ceased to exist. In support of this (view of an enduring Self) we have the Brāhmaṇa-text—Having declared that 'This same is the Self', (*Bṛhadā-Upa.*, 4. 5. 13, where the reading is slightly different), it goes on to say—'Being imperishable, it perisheth not' (*Bṛhadāranyaka-Upaniṣad*, 4. 5. 15); and again, 'This Self is indestructible, not liable to disruption' (*Ibid.*, 4. 5. 15).—Cognition on the other hand is evanescent.—Hence we conclude that the Self (which is imperishable) must be something distinct from the Cognition which is evanescent. No one can hold the view that "things are *not* as they are found to be, they *are* as they are not found to be." For if that were so, then it would come to this that "the Hare does not exist, what does exist is the Hare's Horn"!—Nor again can the notion of 'I' be said to be an illusion; because we do not find any subsequent cognition sublativ of that notion.

From all this we conclude that there *is* a Self apart from Pleasure and other cognitions. And such being the case, it is this Self that has been spoken of in the Vedic text as 'equipped with the sacrificial implements'.

Says the opponent:—"If there is a *Cogniser* distinct from the *Cognition*, then, leaving aside the *Cognition*, please point out the *Cogniser*—'This and such is the *Cogniser*'. You cannot point out any such *Cogniser*. Hence we conclude that there is no *Cogniser* apart from the *Cognition*."

Our answer to this is as follows:—As a matter of fact, the *Cogniser* is self-cognised, he cannot be perceived by another; how then could he be pointed out to another? Just as for instance, when a man with eyes himself sees a colour, but he cannot point it out to another who is blind,—and yet, simply because the Colour cannot be pointed out to another, it is not concluded that it does not exist;—in the same manner, a person cognises his own Self, but cannot point it out to another person, for the simple reason that (like the blind man) this other person does not possess the capacity to perceive the said Self (of the former person); and yet this other person cognises his own Self, but not the Self of other persons. So that all individual Selves cognising themselves must exist, even though none of them cognises the other Selves. In support of this we have the following Brāhmaṇa-text—'When speech ceases, what light does the Person possess? He possesses the light of the Self, O king' (*Shatapatha Brā-Mādhyandina*, 14. 5. 4. 11, and *Bṛhadāranyaka-Upaniṣad*, *Kāṇva*, 4. 3. 9 where the reading is slightly different).—In support also of the view that one Self is not apprehended by another, we have the (Brāhmaṇa-text—'Being inapprehensible,

it is not apprehended' *Bṛhadāraṇyaka-Upaniṣad*, 3. 9. 25); what this means is that it is not apprehended *by another*;—'how so?'—because the Self has been spoken of as 'self-luminous' in the text 'Herein the Person is self-luminous' (*Bṛhadāraṇyaka-Upaniṣad*, 4. 3. 9) [which means that the Self is cognised by itself, not by another self].—"By what means then can one Self be explained to another?"—This means also has been indicated in the Brāhmaṇa-text itself—"He said that this Self is *not this, not that*' *Bṛhadā-Upa.* 4. 23;—that is to say, it cannot be asserted that 'the Self has such and such a form'; the method by which it can be indicated to another is by denying (i.e. rejecting) what the other person regards as Self; that is, if the other person regards the Body as the Self, he is taught that 'the Body is not the Self, the Self is something different from the Body',—where the teaching of the Self is done by denying the Body. Similarly the Life-breath and such other things not being the Self, the Self is taught by means of the denial of these as being something different from the Self. Similarly the Pleasure and other Cognitions of one person are inferred by another through certain signs, and by declaring that 'these are not the Self', the Self is taught as being something different from them. Lastly, that 'the Person (or Self) is not different from one who perceives himself' is also inferred from the activities of the person himself: for instance, we find that when on one day a man has left an action half-done, he tries to make up for it and complete it on the next day; and from this action it is inferred that the Person regards himself as enduring (lasting) in relation to things (like actions) that are evanescent. [Or, on the basis of the *evanescent* activities one comes to cognise the *enduring* Self.]

Further, through Analogy also this same Self is pointed out, in the words—"Just as you perceive your own Self, so on the same analogy, please understand that I also perceive the Self in the same manner." There are several such indications through Analogy; as for instance, a man indicating his suffering to another, says—"It is *as if* I were being burnt', 'It is *as if* I were being tortured', 'It is *as if* I were being hampered.'—Thus on the ground of this self-realisation, it is concluded that there is a Person (Self) distinct from Cognition.

It has been urged by the Opponent above—"Leaving aside Cognition please point out the *Cogniser* apart from the *Cognition*."—Our answer to this is that when you leave aside the *means* itself, how can the *end* be attained without the means? The only means of knowing things is to realise that 'everything *is* as it is cognised to be'. For instance, what is 'white'?—It is that in which there is *whiteness*; i.e. that to which the term 'white' is applied.—To what is the term 'white' applied?—It is applied to that which is cognised (understood) whenever the term 'white' is uttered.—From this it will be seen that if we 'leave aside Cognition' (as suggested in our argument), we cannot indicate anything at all [as things can be indicated only as they are *cognised*].—Then again, there is no such hard and fast rule as that the *object of cognition* is cognised only when the Cognition itself is cognised; the object is actually cognised even when the Cognition is not cognised; for instance, *Cognition* is not amenable to Sense-perception, while

the *object known* is amenable to it. This we have already explained above (*Text*, p. 9, l. 15, where it is shown that the form of the *Cognition* is not the same as that of the *cognised object*).—So that if anything has to be ‘left aside’ (denied), *Cognition* itself might as well be left aside,—not objects. This also we have already explained (*Text*, p. 10, l. 4).

Thus we conclude that there is an everlasting Person apart from Pleasure and other cognitions.

The Opponent has quoted a text (from the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka-Upaniṣad*) speaking of the Cognition arising out of the elemental substances and entering the same, etc.—Our answer to this is as follows:—As a matter of fact, after this passage had been addressed by Yājñavalkya to Maitrēyī, the latter complained of the teaching, saying ‘Hereby your Reverence has led me into delusion’ (*Shatapatha-Bṛā-Mādhyā*. 14. 7. 3. 14), and in meeting this complaint, Yājñavalkya, repudiating all desire to delude her, has concluded by saying—‘I am not talking delusion; in reality this Self is indestructible, not liable to disruption; but It does come into contact with perishable things (like the Sense-organs, Merit, Demerit, and the like)’ (*Shatapatha-Bṛā-Mādhyā*. 14. 7. 3. 15); from the whole context it is clear that the view of the Upaniṣad is *not* that Cognition is the only entity. Thus there is a great difference [between your view that there is no Self apart from the fleeting *cognitions*, and the view adumbrated in the Upaniṣad text quoted by you and taken along with its whole context].

Lastly, the Opponent has argued that the verb ‘goes’ (in the text ‘the Sacrificer equipped with the sacrificial implements *goes* straight to the heavenly region’) is not injunctive.—The particular word may not be injunctive; but it could very well be reiterative of the injunction contained in such texts as ‘Desiring heaven *one should perform sacrifices*’. So that there is nothing incongruous (in the non-injunctive character of the verb ‘goes’).